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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
In 2008, the U.S. government strove to rescue the collaps-
ing economy. Its extreme measures helped many, but others 
suffered as a result. One of the rescue measures, the Housing 
and Economic Recovery Act, authorized the government to act 
as conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two govern-
ment-sponsored enterprises with critical roles in the home-
mortgage market. Under that conservatorship, Fannie and 
Freddie made a deal with the Department of Treasury. The deal 
guaranteed Fannie and Freddie access to hundreds of billions 
of dollars. But in return, they had to give their net profits to the 
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Treasury—in perpetuity. Fannie’s and Freddie’s junior share-
holders had expected to share in those future profits, but the 
deal wiped out that expectation. So some of those junior share-
holders now challenge that deal. 
We reject the shareholders’ challenge on all fronts. First, 
the Recovery Act gave the government broad, discretionary 
power to enter into the deal. Second, the deal complies with the 
requirements of the Recovery Act, as well as Delaware and 
Virginia corporate law. And third, the relief sought would “re-
strain or affect the exercise of [the government’s] powers” as 
conservator, which the Recovery Act forbids. 12 U.S.C. 
§ 4617(f). That relief, even the monetary relief, would unwind 
the whole deal. So we will affirm the District Court’s dismis-
sal. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory framework 
1. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In the wake of the Great 
Depression, Congress created Fannie, and later Freddie, to sup-
port the home-mortgage market. Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 
450, § 301(b), as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 
183, § 731(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1451 note) (Freddie 
Mac); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-17 (Fannie Mae). Fannie and Freddie 
do so by borrowing money, buying home mortgages, packag-
ing them into guaranteed mortgage-backed securities, and sell-
ing those securities to investors. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1454-55, 1719. 
By buying mortgages and then guaranteeing the resulting 
securities, Fannie and Freddie make the mortgage market both 
more liquid and more stable. Perry Capital LLC v. Mnuchin, 
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864 F.3d 591, 599 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Perry Capital), cert. de-
nied, 138 S. Ct. 978 (2018). They relieve mortgage lenders of 
the risk of default and free up their capital to make more loans. 
As a result, lenders can keep lending to home buyers who meet 
Fannie’s and Freddie’s underwriting standards, secure in the 
knowledge that Fannie and Freddie will buy those mortgages. 
By 2008, Fannie and Freddie owned or guaranteed five trillion 
dollars’ worth of mortgages and mortgage-backed securities—
nearly half of the market. Id. In short, they are the backbone of 
the U.S. residential-mortgage market. 
Fannie and Freddie are government-sponsored enterprises; 
they were created by congressional charter but are owned by 
private shareholders. 2 U.S.C. § 622(8). Although Fannie and 
Freddie are privately owned and publicly traded companies, 
the public has long viewed their securities as implicitly backed 
by the federal government’s credit. That perceived government 
guarantee has helped them to borrow money and to buy mort-
gages more cheaply than they otherwise could have. Perry 
Capital LLC v. Lew, 70 F. Supp. 3d 208, 215 (D.D.C. 2014), 
aff’d in part, 864 F.3d 591. All that borrowing, lending, and 
buying propelled the housing market to record highs by the 
mid-2000’s. 
2. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. Then 
the housing bubble burst. House prices plunged, slashing the 
value of Fannie’s and Freddie’s mortgage portfolios. Fannie’s 
and Freddie’s guarantees put them on the hook not only for the 
mortgages they owned, but also for many mortgage-backed se-
curities based on loans gone bad. Congress feared that they 
might default, threatening not only the housing market but the 
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precarious national economy as a whole. Perry Capital, 864 
F.3d at 599. 
To ward off that threat, Congress passed the Recovery Act. 
The Recovery Act created the Federal Housing Financing 
Agency and empowered it to supervise and regulate Fannie and 
Freddie. 12 U.S.C. § 4511. The Recovery Act gives the Agency 
many enumerated, mostly discretionary powers. For instance, 
it authorizes the Agency’s Director to “appoint the Agency as 
conservator . . . for the purpose of reorganizing [or] rehabilitat-
ing . . . the affairs of” Fannie or Freddie. Id. § 4617(a)(1)-(2). 
As conservator, the Agency inherits all the “rights, titles, pow-
ers, and privileges” of Fannie, Freddie, and their officers, di-
rectors, and shareholders. Id. § 4617(b)(2)(A)(i). The Recovery 
Act also authorizes the Agency as conservator to exercise any 
“incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry out [its enu-
merated] powers.” Id. § 4617(b)(2)(J)(i).  
3. Section 4617(f) of the Recovery Act. Having given the 
Agency sweeping authority and discretion, the Recovery Act 
strictly limits judicial review: “[N]o court may take any action 
to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the 
Agency as a conservator or receiver.” Id. § 4617(f). This case 
turns in part on how to interpret and apply that subsection. 
B. Factual background 
In 2008, the collapse of the housing market cost Fannie and 
Freddie billions of dollars, threatening the U.S. mortgage mar-
ket. The Treasury quickly took steps to prop up Fannie and 
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Freddie. But the mortgage and financial markets remained per-
ilous, and the financial crisis grew worse. So the Agency put 
both Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship. 
Under the Agency’s direction, they entered into funding 
agreements with the Treasury. The Treasury gave each enter-
prise a funding commitment. When Fannie’s or Freddie’s lia-
bilities exceed their assets, they can draw on that funding com-
mitment to keep their net worth in the black. 
In return, the Treasury received one million shares of senior 
preferred stock in each of Fannie and Freddie. These shares 
gave the Treasury a liquidation preference in each enterprise 
equal to $1 billion plus all the money drawn from the Treas-
ury’s funding commitment. The shares also gave the Treasury 
an annual dividend equal to 10% of the liquidation preference, 
if paid in cash.  
The Treasury initially capped its funding commitment at 
$100 billion per enterprise. That was not enough, at least for 
Fannie. Two amendments to the funding agreement more than 
doubled that cap, and Fannie and Freddie wound up drawing 
$116.1 billion and $71.3 billion from the Treasury. But as Fan-
nie and Freddie drew more and more money from the Treasury, 
they owed it larger and larger dividends. In a vicious cycle, 
they sometimes had to draw money from the Treasury just to 
pay the Treasury’s dividends. 
In 2012, the Treasury and the Agency renegotiated the 
funding agreements and agreed to the Third Amendment. The 
Third Amendment replaced the 10% annual dividend with a 
quarterly variable dividend. It set that variable dividend equal 
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to Fannie’s and Freddie’s positive net worth above a capital 
buffer, which was set to decrease with each dividend payment. 
The capital buffer is now down to zero. So each quarter, the 
dividend consumes each enterprise’s entire positive net worth. 
The challengers call this arrangement the Net Worth Sweep. 
In other words, under the Third Amendment, if Fannie or 
Freddie has a positive net worth, it pays all that worth out as a 
dividend to the Treasury. If its net worth is zero or negative, it 
pays nothing. Fannie and Freddie pay only what they can. That 
way, they need never again draw from the Treasury to pay the 
Treasury’s dividends. But they also have no money left over to 
pay dividends to junior shareholders or to redeem the Treas-
ury’s shares, exit conservatorship, and return to private control. 
C. Procedural history  
David Jacobs and Gary Hindes filed this class-action suit 
against the Agency, Treasury, Fannie, and Freddie to challenge 
the Third Amendment. Their original complaint asserted 
claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and vi-
olations of Delaware and Virginia corporate law. 
The challengers later amended their complaint, voluntarily 
dismissing their claims for breach of contract, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. The amended complaint contains four counts: 
two asserting that the Third Amendment violates Delaware and 
Virginia corporate law, and two new claims against the Treas-
ury for unjust enrichment. It seeks declaratory, injunctive, and 
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monetary relief, including damages, restitution, and disgorge-
ment. 
The Agency, Treasury, Fannie, and Freddie moved to dis-
miss. The District Court granted that motion, holding that 12 
U.S.C. § 4617(f) barred all the challengers’ claims. Jacobs v. 
FHFA, No. 15-708-GMS, 2017 WL 5664769, at *1 (D. Del. 
Nov. 27, 2017). It reasoned that the Agency acted within its 
statutory powers, that the Recovery Act did not incorporate 
state law, and that § 4617(f)’s “sweeping limitations . . . on ju-
dicial review” deprived it of jurisdiction. Id. at *3-5. The court 
also refused to take judicial notice of certain documents that 
allegedly undermined the Agency’s and Treasury’s assertions, 
because it did not rely on those assertions in reaching its deci-
sion. Id. at *7. 
This appeal followed. Like the District Court, we do not 
rely on those assertions, so we will affirm the refusal to take 
judicial notice of the challengers’ documents. We review the 
District Court’s dismissal de novo. Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 
148, 153 (3d Cir. 1998). 
II. THE RECOVERY ACT EMPOWERED THE AGENCY TO 
ENTER INTO THE THIRD AMENDMENT 
Section 4617(f) bars claims when 1) the government acts as 
a conservator, 2) it does not exceed its statutory authority, and 
3) the remedy sought would affect the exercise of that author-
ity. So to figure out whether § 4617(f) bars the challengers’ 
claims, we first identify “the powers or functions of the Agency 
as a conservator.” In this part of the opinion, we hold that the 
Act empowers the Agency to enter into the Third Amendment. 
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In Part III, we go on to hold that the Third Amendment does 
not contravene any other limitations in the Recovery Act. And 
in Part IV, we hold that the relief requested by the challengers 
would “restrain or affect” the Agency’s exercise of its powers. 
So the District Court properly dismissed this suit. 
The Recovery Act defines the Agency’s “powers . . . as a 
conservator.” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f). Those powers are many and 
mostly discretionary, including: 
• the power to take over Fannie’s and Freddie’s assets. 
Id. § 4617(b)(2)(B)(i). 
• the power to operate Fannie and Freddie, using all 
of the officers’, directors’, and shareholders’ pow-
ers. Id. 
• the power to “preserve and conserve” Fannie’s and 
Freddie’s assets. Id. § 4617(b)(2)(B)(iv). 
• the power to “take such action as may be . . . neces-
sary to put [Fannie and Freddie] in a sound and sol-
vent condition,” and appropriate to carry on their 
business. Id. § 4617(b)(2)(D). 
These powers authorized the Agency to enter into the Third 
Amendment. To begin, the Third Amendment is an exercise of 
the Agency’s power to take over Fannie and Freddie’s assets 
and operate their businesses. Id. § 4617(b)(2)(B)(i). To operate 
their businesses, Fannie and Freddie must secure ongoing ac-
cess to capital, manage debt loads, control cash flow, and de-
cide whether and how to pay dividends. Perry Capital, 864 
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F.3d at 607. The Third Amendment is in essence a renegotia-
tion of an existing lending agreement (albeit with equity rather 
than debt). Saxton v. FHFA, 901 F.3d 954, 960-61 (8th Cir. 
2018) (Stras, J., concurring). That is a traditional power of cor-
porate officers or directors. Id. And the Agency, as conserva-
tor, inherits those powers. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(B)(i). 
Next, the Third Amendment falls within the Agency’s 
power to “preserve and conserve [Fannie’s and Freddie’s] as-
sets” and to do what is “necessary to put [Fannie and Freddie] 
in a sound and solvent condition.” 12 U.S.C. 
§ 4617(b)(2)(B)(iv), (D)(i). The Agency “may” exercise those 
powers “as appropriate,” so we ask only whether the Agency 
picked a suitable action, not the best alternative. Saxton, 901 
F.3d at 961–62 (Stras, J., concurring). 
Before the Third Amendment, the challengers admit, Fan-
nie and Freddie sometimes had to draw funds from the Treas-
ury just to pay the Treasury’s dividend. App. 51-52. That dug 
Fannie and Freddie deeper and deeper into the hole, increasing 
their future dividend obligations while also reducing their 
available funds. “The Third Amendment permanently elimi-
nated” that Catch-22, as well as the associated “risk that cash-
dividend payments would consume [Fannie’s and Freddie’s] 
lifeline.” Roberts v. FHFA, 889 F.3d 397, 404-05 (7th Cir. 
2018). So the Agency could reasonably conclude that the Third 
Amendment would “preserve and conserve [Fannie’s and 
Freddie’s] assets” in the long run, putting them on a “sound 
and solvent” footing. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(B)(iv), (D)(i). 
Case: 17-3794     Document: 003113085651     Page: 12      Date Filed: 11/14/2018
13 
 
Any of these powers alone would have authorized the 
Agency to enter into the Third Amendment. Indeed, every fed-
eral court of appeals to address this issue has held that adopting 
the Third Amendment “falls within [the Agency’s] statutory 
conservatorship powers.” Perry Capital, 864 F.3d at 606; ac-
cord Saxton, 901 F.3d at 959; Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 
640, 653 (5th Cir. 2018); Roberts, 889 F.3d at 403; Robinson 
v. FHFA, 876 F.3d 220, 232 (6th Cir. 2017). We agree. The 
Recovery Act empowered the Agency to enter into the Third 
Amendment. 
III. THE THIRD AMENDMENT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE 
RECOVERY ACT’S LIMITATIONS 
The Third Amendment does not violate any other provision 
of the Recovery Act. The challengers assert that it violates Del-
aware and Virginia corporate law, as supposedly incorporated 
by two provisions of the Recovery Act (known as the succes-
sion clause and the repudiation-of-contracts clause). They also 
assert that it violates the Act’s liquidation-of-assets procedures 
and its alleged requirement to serve Fannie’s and Freddie’s in-
terests, rather than the government’s. But that is not so. 
A. The Recovery Act’s provisions supposedly incorpo-
rating Delaware and Virginia law 
Federal regulation required each enterprise to pick a state’s 
laws for its corporate governance. 12 C.F.R. § 1239.3(b)(1). 
Fannie chose Delaware law; Freddie chose Virginia law. The 
chosen state’s laws govern each enterprise to the extent that 
they are consistent with the enterprise’s authorizing statute and 
other federal law. Id. 
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The challengers contend that the Recovery Act’s succes-
sion clause and repudiation-of-contracts clause incorporate and 
require the Agency to follow Delaware and Virginia corporate 
law. So, they reason, if the Agency violates those laws, it also 
violates the Recovery Act itself. Because the Agency suppos-
edly violated Delaware and Virginia law, it violated the Act 
itself and acted ultra vires. The Agency responds that the Re-
covery Act does not incorporate those state-law requirements 
and that, even if it did, they would be preempted. 
The challengers’ argument fails because the Third Amend-
ment is consistent with both states’ laws. So we need not de-
cide whether and to what extent the Act itself requires the 
Agency to follow Delaware and Virginia law. We also need not 
decide whether federal law preempts these states’ laws. 
1. The Third Amendment complies with Delaware law. The 
challengers claim that the Third Amendment does not specify 
a rate at which to pay the Treasury’s dividend. They also claim 
that it does not pay the Treasury in preference to or in relation 
to other classes of shareholders. Both arguments miss the mark. 
a. The dividend rate. Delaware’s corporate law entitles 
“holders of preferred or special stock . . . to receive dividends 
at such rates . . . as shall be stated in the certificate of incorpo-
ration or in the [board] resolution or resolutions providing for 
the issue of such stock.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 151(c) (2017). 
The Treasury receives all of Fannie’s and Freddie’s positive 
net worth in perpetuity, the challengers argue, not just a speci-
fied dividend rate.  
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But the Third Amendment does specify a rate: 100%. The 
challengers cite no Delaware authority holding this rate unlaw-
ful. So the rate argument fails. 
b. The dividend preference. That same provision of Dela-
ware law authorizes dividends “payable in preference to, or in 
such relation to, the dividends payable on any other class . . . of 
stock.” Id. The challengers claim that the Third Amendment 
does not create a preference, but rather permanently eliminates 
all other shareholders’ dividends. And it cannot be payable in 
relation to another dividend that does not exist. 
This argument fails too. The Treasury’s dividend is payable 
in preference to all other classes of stock. It is always paid first 
and with all available funds. The challengers cite no Delaware 
authority suggesting that this preference is unlawful or that it 
must reserve funds to pay junior stockholders. Indeed, § 151 
contemplates that preferred shareholders’ dividends may ab-
sorb all funds and leave none for junior shareholders: once pre-
ferred dividends have been paid out “to the extent of the pref-
erence, . . . a dividend on the remaining class or classes or series 
of stock may then be paid out of the remaining assets of the 
corporation available for dividends.” Id. (emphases added). So 
common shareholders are not guaranteed dividends. They may 
receive the dividends only if the board approves, only if pre-
ferred shareholders are paid, and only if assets remain available 
for dividends. Here, after paying the Treasury’s dividend, no 
assets remain. So even if Delaware law applies, the Third 
Amendment complies with it. 
2. The Third Amendment complies with Virginia law. The 
challengers reiterate their dividend-preference argument for 
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Freddie, this time under Virginia law. Virginia statutory and 
case law, they argue, forbids the Third Amendment’s pre-
ferred-dividend arrangement. 
Virginia law authorizes corporations to issue classes of 
stock that have preference over other classes. Va. Code Ann. 
§ 13.1-638(C)(4) (West 2018). The challengers again claim 
that the Treasury does not merely have a preference, but ex-
cludes other classes of stock entirely. But that is a preference, 
just an extreme one. Nothing in the statute forbids that prefer-
ence. 
The challengers also rely on two century-old Virginia 
cases. One of them described the “common understanding” 
that preferred shareholders get first dibs on earnings through 
“limited dividends,” while common shareholders get the “hope 
of unlimited gain” through the company’s “surplus profits.” 
Johnson v. Johnson & Briggs, Inc., 122 S.E. 100, 103 (Va. 
1924). But a “common understanding” is not a rigid rule. And 
nothing about this case is “common.” Fannie and Freddie are 
public-private entities in conservatorship under an intricate 
statutory scheme tailored to respond to an economic catastro-
phe. The ordinary case does not control. 
The challengers’ other case is likewise inapt. That case held 
that a corporation may not agree to pay preferred dividends 
when it lacks earnings with which to pay them. Drewry, 
Hughes Co. v. Throckmorton, 92 S.E. 818, 819 (Va. 1917). But 
the Third Amendment abides by this rule. Fannie and Freddie 
pay Treasury a dividend only when they have funds to pay. 
Case: 17-3794     Document: 003113085651     Page: 16      Date Filed: 11/14/2018
17 
 
In short, the Third Amendment comports with both Dela-
ware’s and Virginia’s laws. No authority even puts the matter 
in doubt, so we see no need to certify the issues to the Delaware 
or Virginia Supreme Court. The challengers’ claims under the 
Recovery Act’s succession and repudiation-of-contracts 
clauses fail. See Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. FHFA, Nos. 13-
1053, 13-1439, 13-1288, 2018 WL 4680197, at *17 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 28, 2018). 
B. The Recovery Act’s priorities for liquidating assets 
Next, the challengers argue that the Third Amendment vio-
lates the Recovery Act’s specified priorities for distributing as-
sets on liquidation, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(3)-(9), (c). 
As common shareholders, the challengers would have had cer-
tain claims upon Fannie’s and Freddie’s assets if the enter-
prises had been put into liquidation. But as the District Court 
explained, these provisions do not apply because neither Fan-
nie nor Freddie is in liquidation. Jacobs, 2017 WL 5664769, at 
*6. 
Perry Capital is not to the contrary. Though it allowed a 
liquidation-preferences claim to go forward, it did so because 
the stock certificates themselves guaranteed a liquidation pref-
erence. The wording of the certificates gave the plaintiffs there 
a claim for anticipatory breach of contract. Perry Capital, 864 
F.3d at 632-33.  
But here, there is no claim that the stock certificates create a 
liquidation priority; the challengers’ liquidation claim rests en-
tirely on the Recovery Act. And the challengers voluntarily dis-
missed their breach-of-contract claim. So Perry Capital is inapt. 
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C. The Agency’s multiple constituencies and additional 
powers 
The challengers next assert that the Agency as conservator 
should have focused solely on maximizing Fannie’s and Fred-
die’s financial returns. They charge the Agency with “acting in 
Treasury’s interest, and not [Fannie’s and Freddie’s] interest, 
and acting in a manner [in which Fannie and Freddie] them-
selves had no power to act, when implementing the” Third 
Amendment. Jacobs Br. 49. But the Recovery Act authorizes 
the Agency to do just that. 
1. The Agency’s multiple constituencies. When the Agency 
acts as conservator, it need not act solely in Fannie’s and Fred-
die’s interests, as a traditional conservator would. It may also 
act to protect its own interests and those of the public. 
At common law, a conservator could not “act[ ]  for the ben-
efit of [himself] or a third party.” Perry Capital, 864 F.3d at 
641 (Brown, J., dissenting). But the Agency is no “common-
law conservator.” Id. at 613 (majority opinion). The Recovery 
Act authorizes the Agency to use its powers as conservator in 
whatever way it “determines is in the best interests of [Fannie 
or Freddie] or the Agency.” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(J)(ii) (em-
phasis added). As the D.C. Circuit explained, this provision re-
flects Congress’s “deliberate choice” to let the Agency “act in 
its own best governmental interests, which may include the 
taxpaying public’s interest.” Perry Capital, 864 F.3d at 608. 
That authorization implements the Recovery Act’s mandate 
that the Agency “ensure that” Fannie and Freddie “operate[ ]  
[in a manner] consistent with the public interest.” 12 U.S.C. 
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§ 4513(a)(1)(B), (B)(v). In the same vein, the Act instructs the 
Treasury not to buy Fannie’s and Freddie’s securities unless 
doing so would “provide stability to the financial markets” and 
“protect the taxpayer.” Id. §§ 1455(l)(1)(B)(i), (iii), 
1719(g)(1)(B)(i), (iii). 
While the Agency must consider the public interest, it need 
not consider the interests of Fannie’s and Freddie’s sharehold-
ers. That becomes clear when we compare the Recovery Act 
with its predecessor. Much of the Recovery Act is closely pat-
terned on an earlier financial-institution-rescue law, the Finan-
cial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act 
(FIRREA). For instance, the Recovery Act’s limitation on ju-
dicial review is copied almost verbatim from the one in 
FIRREA. Compare id. § 4617(f), with id. § 1821(j). Because 
“Congress use[d] the same language in two statutes having 
similar purposes,” we “presume that Congress intended that 
text to have the same meaning in both statutes.” Smith v. City 
of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005). So our sister courts of 
appeals all interpret § 4617(f) by looking to their precedents on 
§ 1821(j). See, e.g., Perry Capital, 864 F.3d at 605-06; Robin-
son, 876 F.3d at 227; Roberts, 889 F.3d at 402. We will too. 
FIRREA permits the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion to act as conservator “in the best interests of the [bank], its 
depositors, or the [FDIC].” 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(J)(ii) (em-
phasis added). So the FDIC could take into account the inter-
ests of depositors. But the Recovery Act omits the analogue of 
depositors—shareholders—from its list, referring only to the 
best interests of Fannie, Freddie, and the Agency. Id. 
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§ 4617(b)(2)(J)(ii); see Perry Capital, 864 F.3d at 608. Partic-
ularly because Congress modeled the Recovery Act on 
FIRREA, the Recovery Act’s omission of shareholders’ inter-
ests is telling. In short, the Agency is supposed to act in its own 
interests (which reflect the interests of the government and the 
public), not in the interests of Fannie’s and Freddie’s share-
holders. 
The Third Amendment thus threw Fannie and Freddie a 
$200-billion-plus lifeline to safeguard not just their own inter-
ests, but also the government’s and the public’s interests. These 
other constituencies benefit from a risk-averse approach. Even 
if the economy collapses again, the Agency, the government, 
and the public will be assured that Fannie and Freddie can con-
tinue to stabilize the housing market.  
The Third Amendment also serves Fannie’s and Freddie’s 
own interests. They did not give away their future net worth 
for nothing. In consideration, the Treasury gave up its right to 
an unconditional 10% dividend, which sometimes cost Fannie 
and Freddie more than their positive net worth and forced them 
to borrow even more. The Third Amendment thus insured Fan-
nie and Freddie against downturns and “death spirals,” pre-
venting unpayable dividends from ratcheting up their debt 
loads to unsustainable levels. Saxton, 901 F.3d at 962 (Stras, 
J., concurring). 
2. The Agency’s powers extend beyond Fannie’s and Fred-
die’s powers. Finally, it does not matter if the Agency acted in 
a way that Fannie and Freddie could not have. The Recovery 
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Act gave the Agency not only powers inherited from those en-
terprises, but also a host of other powers. And the Agency acted 
within those statutory powers. 
IV. SECTION 4617(f) BARS THE REQUESTED RELIEF 
The Recovery Act empowered the Agency to enter into the 
Third Amendment. And the Third Amendment does not violate 
any of the Recovery Act’s limitations. So entering into the 
Third Amendment was a legitimate exercise of the Agency’s 
powers as conservator. 
The only remaining issue is whether the challengers’ re-
quested relief would “restrain or affect the exercise of [the 
Agency’s] powers . . . as a conservator.” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f). 
The challengers concede that it would. And § 4617(f) applies 
to all forms of relief that would do so, not just injunctions or 
equitable relief. So that subsection bars all the relief requested 
here. 
A. The challengers concede that they seek to undo the 
Third Amendment 
At oral argument, the challengers admitted that the relief 
they seek would undo the entire Third Amendment. They 
would have us void it and force the Treasury to disgorge all the 
dividends that it received under the Third Amendment. Undo-
ing the Third Amendment would restrain the Agency’s powers. 
So the challengers’ concession dooms their case. 
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B. Section 4617(f) applies to monetary relief that would 
restrain or affect the exercise of the Agency’s powers as 
conservator 
The challengers argue, however, that their concession does 
not bar their claims for monetary relief. They claim that 
§ 4617(f) applies only to “equitable and injunctive relief,” not 
damages claims. Appellants’ Br. 41-43. They even call that 
subsection an “anti-injunction clause.” Id. at 19. But that label 
is inaccurate. 
Their argument has some support. Some courts of appeals 
likewise call § 4617(f) an “anti-injunction” clause. E.g., Sax-
ton, 901 F.3d at 957; Robinson, 876 F.3d at 227. And some 
interpret § 4617(f) as barring only equitable relief, not damages 
claims. E.g., Saxton, 901 F.3d at 957; Perry Capital, 864 F.3d 
at 606, 613-14. 
We decline to adopt this interpretation for two reasons. 
First, the text of § 4617(f) is not limited to declaratory, injunc-
tive, or other equitable relief. Second, our FIRREA precedent 
suggests that § 4617(f) also bars some monetary claims. 
1. The text of § 4617(f) extends to monetary relief. Section 
4617(f) reads, in full: “Except as provided in this section or at 
the request of the Director, no court may take any action to 
restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the 
Agency as a conservator or a receiver.” 
Nothing in that text refers to the type or form of remedy a 
plaintiff seeks. It says nothing about law versus equity or dam-
ages versus injunctions. Rather, the text forbids courts to take 
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“any action” that seeks to “restrain or affect” the Agency’s ex-
ercise of its powers as conservator. The focus is not on the form 
of requested relief, but its effect. If monetary relief would have 
that effect, then it is barred. If not, then it is permitted. 
2. Our FIRREA precedent supports applying § 4617(f) to 
some monetary relief. That interpretation accords with our 
cases interpreting FIRREA’s parallel provision. In Rosa v. Res-
olution Trust Corp., we held that § 1821(j) barred monetary re-
lief granted as part of an injunction. 938 F.2d 383, 399 (3d Cir. 
1991). We did not rely on the equitable nature of the relief. 
What mattered was that the relief would have impeded the Res-
olution Trust Corporation’s powers as “conservator promptly 
to perform its important functions in dealing with the savings 
and loan crisis.” Id. The plaintiffs were limited to seeking a 
“remedy that would not ‘restrain or affect’ the exercise of the 
receiver’s or conservator’s powers or functions.” Id. 
Our later precedent continued to apply Rosa’s approach. 
Hindes, for example, recognized that § 1821(j) leaves open “a 
judicial remedy for an appropriate damages claim.” 137 F.3d 
at 161 (emphasis added). But not all damages claims are ap-
propriate. Courts have suggested that appropriate damages 
claims might include constitutional claims, breach-of-contract 
claims, claims authorized by FIRREA or the Recovery Act 
through the administrative process, claims based on ultra vires 
Agency action, and other damages claims that do not restrain 
or affect the Agency’s exercise of its authorized powers. See 
id. (constitutional claims); Perry Capital, 864 F.3d at 614 
(same, as well as breach of contract); Saxton, 901 F.3d at 960 
n.8 (Stras, J., concurring) (constitutional challenges to the 
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Agency’s structure); Collins, 896 F.3d at 659 (same); Gross v. 
Bell Sav. Bank Pa SA, 974 F.2d 403, 407-08 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(administrative claims authorized by FIRREA and claims of 
ultra vires agency action); Rosa, 938 F.2d at 399 (other claims 
that would not restrain or affect the exercise of authorized pow-
ers). 
Here, the challengers’ claims fall into none of these catego-
ries. They are not constitutional. They have not gone through 
the Recovery Act’s administrative process. They do not flow 
from ultra vires agency action. And they are not claims for 
breach of contract. 
Their claims would also restrain or affect the Agency’s ex-
ercise of its statutory powers. The Recovery Act empowered 
the Agency to enter into the Third Amendment. And all parties 
agree that § 4617(f) bars declaratory and injunctive relief. But 
granting the challengers’ claims for damages, restitution, or 
disgorgement would require us to find the Third Amendment 
unlawful. The challengers cannot evade the bar on declaratory 
relief by asking for such a declaration as the basis for awarding 
damages. No matter how we label the relief, striking down the 
Third Amendment would interfere with the Agency’s exercise 
of its powers as conservator. 
Even apart from the declaratory aspect, awarding monetary 
relief would restrain or affect the Agency’s conservatorship. 
The request for damages, disgorgement, and restitution, 
against both the Agency and the Treasury, would (as the chal-
lengers concede) unravel the Third Amendment, reverse the 
monetary payments made under it, and prevent or at least deter 
the Agency from implementing it further. Those are the same 
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consequences that would flow from granting an injunction or a 
declaratory judgment. So the monetary relief sought here 
would restrain or affect the exercise of the Agency’s powers as 
conservator. All of it is barred by § 4617(f). 
* * * * * 
The challengers are in an unfortunate spot. They invested 
in Fannie and Freddie, expecting regular dividend payments in 
return. The Third Amendment destroyed those expectations. 
But the Recovery Act is clear. It empowered the Agency to 
enter into the Third Amendment. That deal complies with Del-
aware law, Virginia law, and the Recovery Act itself. And the 
challengers’ requested relief would effectively unwind the 
Third Amendment. Doing so would restrain or affect the 
Agency’s exercise of its powers as conservator. 
This we cannot do. So we will affirm. 
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